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Abstract:  
 
Does incentive pay affect the wage structure of firms? Does the way individual productivity is 
measured matter for such effects? The aim of this paper is to analyze the wage structure of 
Dutch firms to answer these questions about the relation between wage structure and incentive 
pay. We use biennial data covering the period 1993-2001 from a panel of 3,000 Dutch 
establishments with detailed information about the wage structure of the establishment, 
background characteristics, along with the wage and personnel policy of the firm. It is the first 
representative study about the wage structure of firms in the Netherlands. In the cross-section 
we find that wage in firms using subjective evaluations to determine incentive pay are on 
average 5.9% higher. Variance of the earnings is 21.6% higher. There are no significant 
differences between firms that use objective measures and firms that do not use incentive pay. 
Panel estimates of the effect of incentive pay on the wage distribution, using fixed 
establishment effects, reveal an effect of 2.2% on mean earning. The differences in the 
variance of the distribution between firms that use subjective measures for incentive pay and 
other firms are similar to the cross-sectional results, indicating that the incentive scheme fully 
accounts for these differences between firms. It takes about three years before this increase in 
variance is realized. We find no effects for incentive schemes based on objective standards, 
no effect for the skewness and only a short run effect for the kurtosis of the wage distribution. 
 
JEL Code: M52, J33, J31  
Keywords: Incentive Pay; Wage level; Wage distribution 
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1. Introduction 
 
Does incentive pay affect the wage structure of firms? Does the way individual productivity is 
measured matter for such effects? The aim of this paper is to analyze the wage structure of 
Dutch firms to answer these questions about the relation of wage structure and incentive pay. 
We use biennial data covering the period 1989-2001 from a panel of 3,000 Dutch 
establishments with detailed information about the wage structure of the establishment and 
the wage and personnel policy of the firm. It is also the first representative study about the 
wage structure of firms in the Netherlands.  In our paper we examine the effect of incentive 
pay on the wage distribution within the firm. We link the various moments of the distribution 
to several aspects of the firms.  
The data distinguishes between firms with and without incentive pay. Incentive pay 
schemes are further split up in systems based on subjective evaluations and systems based on 
objective measurement. Over the time period covered in the data a substantial fraction of 
establishments introduce or cancel incentive pay scheme, allowing fixed effect estimates of 
the effect of incentive pay on several moments of the wage distribution. 
We find that only incentive pay based on subjective evaluation systems affect the 
wage structure. The mean wage of a firm increases slightly, while the variance of wages goes 
up substantially. While the mean wages increase rapidly after the introduction of a scheme, 
the variance increases only gradually. The effect after three years is substantially higher than 
the effect after one year. We find no effect for the skewness, and a modest short run effect for 
the kurtosis of the wage distribution. 
The paper is related to literature about the structure of wages in firms and to literature 
about the effects of incentive pay. Following Lazear and Shaw (2005) there are several papers 
that investigate differences in the wage distributions among firms. There is a wide 
heterogeneity among firms with observationally comparable workers with respect to their 
wage structure. These differences could reflect different wage policies of firms. Lazear and 
Shaw (2005) collect information on wage distribution and some key variable across industries 
for several nations. The wage distribution has an impact on the behavior of the workers within 
the firm, its productivity and work organization. For several countries there are now studies 
that explicitly study wage distributions of firms across a country (Contini and Leombruni 
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(2004) for Italy, Edin, Holmlund and Nordström Skans (2004) and Oyer (2004) for Sweden, 
Bellman and Alda (2004) for Germany, Hunnes, Møen and Salvanes (2004) for Norway, 
Uusitalo and Vartainen (2004) for Finland, Rycx, Lallemand and Plasman (2004) for 
Belgium, Westergaard-Nielsen and Eriksson (2004) for Danmark, Kramarz and Perez-Duarte 
(2004) for France). This is the first study that investigates the wage structure of Dutch firms. 
The main contribution of this paper is that we relate the wage structure to information about 
the use of incentive pay in the firm. Panel data allow us to control for firm specific differences 
in the wage structure. The literature on incentive pay itself has been either dealing with the 
development of optimal incentive schemes, predominantly in the principal-agent theoretical 
context, or by examining the effect of the introduction of incentive pay on the performance of 
the workers and the earnings they receive. This last literature has generated some interest as 
more detailed data-sets became available that include detailed information on productivity, 
wages and turnover per worker. A study that examines the effect of incentive pay on wage 
dispersion is Seiler (1984). Seiler shows that in a cross-section there is a wage difference 
between workers facing incentive pay and others, while they also exhibit higher dispersion. 
He concludes by postulating that future research should include direct measure of productivity 
and incentive pay. The principal set-up for a such a study is already described in  Lazear 
(1986), in which he examines theoretically the relation between salaries and piece rates. He 
predicts that using incentive pay (piece rates) the workforce will be more heterogeneous, 
which would imply a larger variance of pay. In Lazear (2000) a prime example of the 
empirical assessment of the introduction of piece-rates on the behavior of the workforce is 
given. The introduction of piece-rate pay increases the mean (actual) pay slightly, while it 
increased the standard deviation by much more (cf. Lazear’s Table 2 on p. 1352). 
From the agricultural sectors there are several studies on tree-planters from British 
Columbia Paarsch and Schearer (1999) and Paarsch and Schearer (2000), and the Midwestern 
logging industry (Haley (2003)). They estimate the effect in the change of the piece-rate, in 
order to identify its incentive effect. For a refreshingly dissenting voice see Freeman and 
Kleiner (2005) who describes in detail a move from piece rates to fixed rates. They show that 
in their case the manufacturer actually gained from the shift, casting some doubt on the 
general notion that strong incentives are good for the performance.  
 There are only a few papers combining wage distributions within firms with incentive 
pay. Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) connect several forms of HRM policies and its 
effect on productivity. Within the management literature which deals with related concepts, 
e.g. Huselid (1995) links the pay to the behavior of individuals and organizational 
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performance in over 3,000 companies. Both studies are based on cross-sectional comparisons, 
however. Parent (1999) is the only longitudinal study. He examines wage distributions based 
on the NLSY data-set of individual workers, focusing on different methods of pay. The 
longitudinal structure of the NLSY allows him to include worker fixed effects. The current 
paper is the first study in which the effects of incentive pay is investigated for a large 
representative panel of firms including firm fixed effects. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a description of the data. In section 
3 we link the wage distribution to some key variables as industry, age distribution and 
education. Section 4 examines the relationship between the wage distribution and incentive 
pay. Section 5 concludes.   
 
2. Data description  
 
The data we use come from a survey among Dutch establishments carried out on a biannual 
basis by the Institute for Labour Studies (OSA) in the period 1993-2001. Many establishments 
are in the survey for several years, so we can use the data to construct a panel of 
establishments over this period of time. The primary advantage of the database is that it 
allows us to exploit a nationally representative survey of establishments to estimate the effects 
of the adoption of incentive pay. We use the five waves, 1993-2001, for this paper. There are 
more than 3,000 firms in the data-set, but not all are contained in all four waves.  
 
Wage information 
 For each organization in the sample we have data about the number of workers with certain 
characteristics within pre-defined wage brackets. The wage brackets are transformed by using 
the number of workers within the wage brackets and the midpoint to represent wage 
distributions. In essence we first calculate the total wage sum and the total number of workers, 
to then use the information on the distribution over the seven brackets as to identify the higher 
moments of the wage distribution.  
 
--- Figure 1 & 2 about here --- 
 
Figure 1 gives the wage distribution of the mean wage within companies across the 
one-digit sectors of SBI  In figure 2 we can see that larger firms have a higher mean wage. 
They also have longer tails on to the right, i.e. more higher paid positions within the firm. 
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This can be expected as it is especially in higher firms that we do find specialized functions 
and higher hierarchical (managerial) functions which are usually well paid.  
 
 
 
3. Incentive pay:  types and timing of introduction 
 
The data-set contains data on the implementation of two distinct types of incentive pay. The 
incentive pay can be based on subjective evaluations or on quantitative measures, e.g. meeting 
specific targets or piece rates. Subjective evaluation is prone to favoritism, but also to 
leniency towards paying out bonuses.1  
Incentive pay can is identified in three different ways. Firms can use subjective 
measures or evaluations which are linked to payments or bonuses, we call these personal 
evaluation or subjective based incentive pay. The other method of incentive pay is to link it to 
objective measures or figures; we denominate this group by meeting targets. Furthermore, 
firms can use both means of incentive pay, which we indicate by both types of incentive pay. 
In some analyses the use of any form of incentive pay is indicated by the variable incentive. In 
our data the incentive pay is identified by several questions on the use of incentive pay 
anywhere in the firm. We can thus not identify the use in different parts of the organization, 
nor can we discriminate between the use at different hierarchical levels of the company. 
Table 1 gives the distribution of the different forms of incentive pay across industries. 
Overall incentive pay is used quite strongly in governmental organization (58%) – mainly due 
to subjective forms of incentive. Other sectors that use a incentive pay are building (52%), 
and services (44%). Sectors in which few organizations use incentive pay are health care 
(10%) and education (11%).  
The most predominant form of incentive pay is based on subjective measures. Strong 
proponents of this form of pay can be found in governmental organizations, the building 
sector, and the service industry. Objective measures are used for incentive pays 
predominantly in the sectors building, trade, services, agriculture and the industrial sector.  
 
-- Table 2 about here -- 
 
                                                 
1 See also Prendergast (1999) for an excellent overview of the Literature on incentives in firms.  
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The use of incentive pay is actually diminishing in our data-set. Especially the bonuses 
and payments based on subjective evaluations are diminishing from a high of 31% in 1993 to 
a low of 16% in 2001. Objective measures peak in the year 1997 with 17%.  
 
 
3. Wage Distribution – some explanations 
Before we come to the effect of incentive pay on the wage distribution of the firm, let 
us first look at other aspects of the firm that can have an influence on the various moments of 
the distribution. Table 3 gives the regression results of cross sectional regression of the mean, 
variance, skewness and kurtosis on type of organization (one digit SBI), size, percentage of 
female, age, and tenure distribution of the workforce as well as the education level.  
 
--- Table 3 about here --- 
 
These regressions show that a higher proportion of females leads to lower wages, and 
lower variance, but higher skewness and kurtosis. A similar effect has a higher proportion of 
younger workers. Both can be explained by the fact that those workers are quite often at the 
lower end of the salary range, and they will therefore affect these three moments of the 
distribution. The (log) size of the workforce increases mean, variance and skewness of the 
distribution, while the kurtosis is not significantly affected. Higher education increases the 
mean wage, along with the variance, while it decreases skewness and kurtosis. It implies that 
a higher level of education among the workforce is probably a indication of a white collar 
organizations, without affecting the higher moments significantly.  
Mean wages differ also significantly over sectors. Figure 3 summarizes these findings. 
It shows the high average level of pay in Education, Government and Professional Services, 
relative to the Agriculture / Industry sector. Lower average pay are found in Trade, Health 
care, and Other services.  
 
--- Figure 3 about here --- 
 
4. Influence of incentive pay on the wage distribution 
Figure 4 gives the distribution of mean wages for the firms using the different forms of 
incentive pay, or giving no incentive pay at all. While it has been generated for one year 
(1995), it is typical for the forms over all the years. One can see the distinct difference 
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between the firms using subjective evaluations (indicated by the squares), and those using 
preset standards (diamonds). The distribution of those firms that are using both methods 
resembles more those that use no incentive at all, but with thicker tails.  
 
-- Figure 4 about here -- 
 
The effect of incentive wage on mean wage level is not clear-cut theoretically. Ceteris 
paribus wages should be higher than without incentive pay. If all workers were allocated to its 
production sites that they self-select into, i.e. after all productivity sorting, the effect of 
incentive pay on productivity was positive (see e.g. Lazear (2000)). We thus would have the 
effect that the more productive workers are allocated to the incentive wage paying firms, in 
which they also perform better due to the direct incentives.  
However, many firms that were examined so far are from a distinct type, there is a 
simple production process, in which the output is easily observed. Hence it is ideal for piece 
rates. From this literature the strongest evidence towards a qualitative selection of high 
productivity workers into piece rate firms are generated. We are dealing with a sample of 
firms that are more representative for an entire economy. In environments that allow easy 
tying of incentives to output we would expect that objective measures are linked to incentive 
pay. In environments that do not involve such a link, subjective evaluations could still allow a 
firm to use incentive pay. In this last case, however, the outcome is prone to the general 
problems of subjective evaluations, i.e. grade inflation and favoritism.  
 
-- Table 5, 6 about here -- 
 
The cross-sectional regression of the mean of a firm’s wage distribution (Table 5) 
shows that incentive pay increases the mean wage (first column), while the second regression 
reveals that this higher mean wage is due to firms using subjective evaluations. These results 
are corrected for several variables of the workforce that can significantly change the wage 
distribution (cf. Table 4 for a regression explaining the wage distribution without including 
incentive pay variables). The average mean income in these firms is 5.9% higher. Other 
specification of the model, in which we approximated the wage profile using log-wages, or in 
which we transferred the outcomes to logs after constructing the wage distribution give 
similar results. The fixed-effect estimation (Table 6) shows a substantially smaller effect of 
subjective evaluations, in the second regression. The size of the effect equal approximately 
 8
2.2% of the mean wage in a firm. Thus introducing subjective evaluations slightly rises the 
mean level of pay.   
The variance of pay can be related to the use of incentive pay. As Seiler (1984) shows 
does the stochastic element of the productivity translates in systems that involve piece rates 
into higher variance of pay. In the cross-sectional regression, we see that the variance is 
actually increasing with incentive pay (column 1 of the results in Table 7), however this is due 
to the subjective evaluation rather than the objective evaluations as piece rates are (column 2, 
Table 7). The variance of firms to apply incentive pay with subjective measures have a 21.6% 
higher variance of the wages. The increasing variance of piece rates translates through to the 
fixed-effect model (see Table 8). In the third column we include separate variables for the 
effect of incentive pay in the first wave of the panel after its introduction. The regression 
shows that the main effects of incentive pay only are not realized in this first wave. The effect 
of this separate variable almost offsets the effect of incentive pay in general. It therefore 
seems to take at lest three years before the effect of incentive pay on the variance of wages is 
fully established.  
Kurtosis and skewness are not significantly affected by incentive pay in firms (cf. 
Tables 9 and 10 for the skewness, and Tables 11 and 12 for kurtosis). Only the subjective 
evaluation seems to have a weak positive effect on the kurtosis, leading to fatter tails of the 
distribution.  
Several studies have stressed that changes in the pay schemes of firms might also 
changes the type of workers that are employed in a firm. We therefore investigated whether 
the inflow and outflow of workers right after the introduction of incentive pay changed, but 
found no significant effects. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In a cross-section, establishments with incentive pay are characterized by high mean wages 
(+5.9%), a high variance of the wages (+21.6%). The difference in mean wages and variance 
are only observed in firms with incentive schemes based on subjective evaluation.  
 Panel estimates of the effect of incentive pay on the distribution of wages, using fixed 
establishment effects, reveal a substantially smaller effect for the mean wages in comparison 
with cross-sectional results. This indicates that the introduction of incentive pay is associated 
with an increase of wages of about 2.2%. The remainder of the effect seems to be due to 
differences in firm characteristics not related to incentive pay schemes. For the variance of 
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wages the fixed effect panel estimator, however, provides similar effects as the cross-sectional 
estimates, suggesting that all differences between firms with and without incentive pay based 
on subjective assessment, can be related to introduction of this scheme. The estimates show 
that it takes about three years before the effects on the variance of wages is fully effectuated.  
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A. Tables 
 
 
Table 1: The use of incentive pay across industries 
 
     SBI     Subjective 
Evaluations 
Objective Measures Any form of 
incentive pay 
SBI  1 Agriculture 0.264 0.170 0.348 
SBI  2 Building 0.396 0.279 0.518 
SBI  3 Trade 0.302 0.223 0.421 
SBI  4 Transport 0.216 0.143 0.287 
SBI  5 Professional Services 0.373 0.216 0.456 
SBI  6 Health care 0.093 0.030 0.103 
SBI  7 Other services 0.223 0.117 0.277 
SBI  8 Government 0.554 0.102 0.584 
SBI  9 Education 0.094 0.039 0.112 
Notes: Table gives the mean of the dummy variable indicating that a firm belongs to the industry of 
the one-digit SBI code. The columns give respectively those firms that use the subjective evaluation, 
the objective measurement to link to incentive pay, while the last column indicates the use of any form 
of incentive pay.  
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Table 2: The use of incentive pay over time 
  Year     Subjective Evaluations Objective Measures Any form of incentive pay 
     1993  0.311 0.107 0.382 
     1995  0.289 0.158 0.334 
     1997  0.283 0.168 0.336 
     1999  0.288 0.150 0.313 
     2001  0.160 0.101 0.268 
Notes: Table gives the mean of the dummy variable indicating that an observation is from a specific 
year. The columns give respectively those firms that use the subjective evaluation, the objective 
measurement to link to incentive pay, while the last column indicates the use of any form of incentive 
pay.  
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Table 3: Explaining the moments of the wage distributions 
                 Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
SBI  2 Building       156.278**    -3.60e+05***      -93.108***     -542.095** 
     (47.705)  (69943.756)     (26.003)     (208.907)  
SBI  3 Trade      -224.022***     3.09e+05***      -80.305***     -322.585  
     (41.591)  (60980.051)     (22.344)     (179.510)  
SBI  4 Transport       113.240     -8.43e+04       -91.985**      -395.674  
     (60.022)  (88002.581)     (32.856)     (263.963)  
SBI  5 Professional 
Services  
     454.331***     5.62e+05***      -77.345***       28.790  
     (41.340)  (60611.135)     (22.156)     (178.001)  
SBI  6 Health care      -168.105***    -5.66e+05***     -154.543***     -992.358***
     (38.884)  (57010.099)     (20.828)     (167.327)  
SBI  7 Other services      -157.533**    -1.36e+05       -90.935**      -472.461*  
     (51.844)  (76012.672)     (28.145)     (226.115)  
SBI  8 Government       664.945***     3.09e+05***     -164.662***     -916.379***
     (46.239)  (67794.043)     (24.699)     (198.428)  
SBI  9 Education       857.675***    1.05e+05      -196.975***     -593.456** 
     (50.446)  (73961.954)     (27.243)     (218.868)  
Log number of workers      189.218***     1.58e+05***       48.289***       49.846  
      (10.616)  (15565.177)      (5.831)       (46.844)  
Female        -0.779***     -476.290**        0.865***        9.123***
       (0.124)    (182.314)      (0.069)        (0.557)  
Age: < 20         0.507       -62.530         1.327***        5.636***
       (0.366)    (536.290)      (0.196)        (1.572)  
Age: 20-29       -3.170***    -2321.721***        1.422***       17.951***
       (0.394)    (577.339)      (0.210)        (1.689)  
Age: 40-49        -0.028     -1677.272***        3.187***       64.056***
       (0.328)    (480.572)      (0.175)        (1.404)  
Age: >50        -0.116      440.339         2.715***      -11.848***
       (0.318)    (466.001)      (0.195)        (1.564)  
Tenure: <5 yrs         0.256       684.076**        2.441***       13.523***
       (0.156)    (228.649)      (0.089)        (0.717)  
Tenure: 5-10 yrs        0.324      678.189*         0.585***       -4.691***
       (0.221)    (324.600)      (0.119)        (0.952)  
Proportion of workers 
with intermediate 
education  
      -0.072       -36.758        -2.494***      -20.571***
       (0.194)    (284.542)      (0.106)        (0.850)  
Proportion of workers 
with college education  
       0.347*       617.611**       -1.099***      -20.776***
       (0.151)    (221.136)      (0.083)        (0.669)  
Proportion of workers 
with postgraduate 
education  
       1.926***     1967.190***       -3.340***      -26.296***
       (0.152)    (222.824)      (0.089)        (0.716)  
Constant      2830.399***     1.02e+06***      -97.009**      -127.193  
      (54.831)  (80391.906)     (29.765)     (239.125)  
R-squared         0.279        0.129        0.621         0.597  
N          5988         5988         5867          5867  
Notes: Standard deviations are given in parentheses next to the regression coefficient.  
The asterisks give the level of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All regressions are 
pooled cross-sectional regressions which include year dummies for 1993-2001.  
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Table 4: Explaining the use of incentive pay: Probit estimations 
 
                    Incentive Pay    
             
        Meeting Standards    
             
        Subjective Standards    
             
       
SBI  2 Building         0.546***      (0.065)        0.461***      (0.071)        0.500***      (0.066) 
SBI  3 Trade         0.250***      (0.057)        0.272***      (0.065)        0.203***      (0.059) 
SBI  4 Transport        -0.185*        (0.085)       -0.174        (0.103)       -0.096        (0.088) 
SBI  5 Professional 
Services  
       0.162**       (0.057)       0.067        (0.066)        0.220***      (0.059) 
SBI  6 Health care        -0.882***      (0.060)       -1.000***      (0.089)       -0.688***      (0.062) 
SBI  7 Other 
services  
      -0.171*        (0.073)       -0.226*       (0.091)       -0.053        (0.076) 
SBI  8 Government         0.477***      (0.065)       -0.358***      (0.085)        0.690***      (0.065) 
SBI  9 Education        -0.960***      (0.091)       -0.768***      (0.114)       -0.835***      (0.095) 
Log number of 
workers 
       0.089***      (0.015)        0.098***      (0.019)        0.076***      (0.015) 
female                 -0.000        (0.000)       -0.000        (0.000)       -0.000        (0.000) 
Age <20                 0.001        (0.001)       -0.000       (0.001)        0.000        (0.001) 
Age 20-29              -0.001        (0.001)       -0.002*       (0.001)       -0.001        (0.001) 
Age 40-49               0.000        (0.000)       -0.002*       (0.001)       -0.000        (0.000) 
Age >50                -0.001        (0.000)       -0.001        (0.001)       -0.000        (0.000) 
Tenure <5 yrs           0.000        (0.000)       0.000        (0.000)        0.000        (0.000) 
Tenure 5-10 yrs         0.000        (0.000)       -0.000        (0.000)        0.000        (0.000) 
Intermediate 
education 
      -0.000        (0.000)        0.001*       (0.000)       -0.000        (0.000) 
College education        0.001*        (0.000)        0.001***      (0.000)        0.000        (0.000) 
Postgraduate 
education 
       0.001***      (0.000)        0.001***      (0.000)        0.001***      (0.000) 
Year 1995             -0.098        (0.056)        0.296***      (0.069)        0.006        (0.057) 
Year 1997             -0.022        (0.053)        0.323***      (0.066)        0.039        (0.055) 
Year 1999              0.074        (0.056)        0.389***      (0.070)        0.204***      (0.057) 
Year 2001             -0.063        (0.079)       0.053        (0.105)       -0.214*        (0.084) 
Year 2003             -0.081        (0.065)       -0.011        (0.088)       -0.059        (0.068) 
Constant               -0.756***      (0.080)       -1.595***      (0.100)       -0.991***      (0.082) 
       
N                    6888     6900   6900   
 
Notes: Probit on the use of respectively incentive pay, objective standards based incentive pay, or 
subjective standards based incentive pay. Standard deviations are given in parentheses next to the 
regression coefficient. The asterisks give the level of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
All regressions are pooled cross-sectional regressions which include year dummies for 1993-2003. 
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Table 5:  Explaining mean wages – cross sectional estimates including incentive pay variables 
                 Mean wage              Mean wage              
 Beta s.e. beta s.e. 
Incentive pay         135.273***     (26.139)                              
Objective Standards                                   -20.139        (35.659) 
Subjective Evaluation                                   177.044***     (28.631) 
SBI  2 Building               127.748**      (47.956)      126.781**      (47.945) 
SBI  3 Trade              -237.008***     (41.603)     -235.331***     (41.548) 
SBI  4 Transport               119.623*       (60.023)      117.897*       (59.847) 
SBI  5 Professional Services         447.391***     (41.304)      441.352***     (41.258) 
SBI  6 Health care              -131.899***     (39.431)     -138.941***     (39.246) 
SBI  7 Other services              -148.162**      (51.863)     -156.278**      (51.711) 
SBI  8 Government               638.873***     (46.447)      615.694***     (46.928) 
SBI  9 Education               898.093***     (50.938)      890.435***     (50.650) 
Log(Number of Workers)           184.968***     (10.640)      185.370***     (10.610) 
Female            -0.761***      (0.124)       -0.754***      (0.124) 
Age <20                 0.472         (0.365)        0.483         (0.365) 
Age 20-29              -3.138***      (0.394)       -3.150***      (0.393) 
Age 40-49              -0.036         (0.327)       -0.037         (0.327) 
Age >50                -0.091         (0.317)       -0.092         (0.317) 
Tenure <5 yrs           0.240         (0.156)        0.238         (0.156) 
Tenure 5-10 yrs         0.313         (0.221)        0.300         (0.221) 
Intermediate education       -0.064         (0.194)       -0.055         (0.193) 
College education        0.326*        (0.151)        0.326*        (0.150) 
Postgraduate education        1.895***      (0.152)        1.890***      (0.152) 
Year 1995            223.582***     (36.822)      219.507***     (36.806) 
Year 1997            309.335***     (35.203)      306.960***     (35.219) 
Year 1999            515.163***     (36.580)      508.475***     (36.623) 
Year 2001            662.493***     (50.160)      663.693***     (49.704) 
Constant             2799.526***     (55.056)     2804.644***     (54.810) 
     
R-squared               0.282                        0.284                 
N                        5976                         5988                 
 
Notes: Standard deviations are given in parentheses next to the regression coefficient. The asterisks 
give the level of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All regressions are pooled cross-
sectional regressions which include year dummies for 1993-2001. 
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Table 6:  Explaining the mean of the wage distribution – fixed-effect panel estimates including 
incentive pay variables 
                 Mean wage              Mean wage              Mean wage              
 beta s.e. beta s.e. beta s.e. 
Incentive pay  23.884  (26.318)    
Objective 
standards  
   -11.242 (33.013)  7.507  (60.043)
Subjective 
evaluations 
  66.204* (27.791) 71.251  (41.091)+
Objective 
standards (first 
wave since 
introduction 
only)  
    -21.310  (56.938)
Subjective 
evaluations  
(first wave since 
introduction 
only)  
   -6.320  (39.487)
Log number of 
workers  
 -81.223**   (29.308)  -82.501** (29.419)  -82.398**  (29.436)
Year 1995   262.369*** (31.691)  263.368*** (31.863)  263.098*** (31.881)
Year 1997   474.376*** (32.386)  476.411*** (32.566)  475.076*** (32.729)
Year 1999   672.498*** (34.836)  671.303*** (35.049)  669.406*** (35.358)
Year 2001   858.130*** (45.212)  855.253*** (45.167)  853.786*** (45.341)
Constant  3819.224***  
(115.276)
3814.831***  
(115.581)
3814.612***  
(115.632)
   
N     7799       7822      7822   
Standard deviations are given in parentheses next to the regression coefficient. The asterisks give the 
level of significance: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All regressions are fixed-effect 
panel regressions 
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Table 7:  Explaining the variance of the wage distribution – cross-sectional estimates including 
incentive pay variables 
                  Variance of 
wage distribution   
             Variance of wage 
distribution 
             
     
Incentive pay        2.36e+05***  (38292.348)                              
Objective 
standards 
                                78950.061     (52294.526) 
Subjective 
evaluations 
                                 2.16e+05***  (41988.648) 
SBI  2 Building         -4.10e+05***  (70252.066)    -4.11e+05***  (70312.414) 
SBI  3 Trade              2.86e+05***  (60945.692)     2.88e+05***  (60931.719) 
SBI  4 Transport       -7.70e+04     (87929.921)    -7.45e+04     (87766.549) 
SBI  5 
Professional 
Services          
    5.50e+05***  (60508.528)     5.45e+05***  (60505.645) 
SBI  6 Health 
care          
   -5.02e+05***  (57763.904)    -5.15e+05***  (57555.807) 
SBI  7 Other 
services          
   -1.18e+05     (75976.702)    -1.29e+05     (75836.034) 
SBI  8 
Government          
    2.63e+05***  (68042.202)     2.56e+05***  (68821.411) 
SBI  9 Education       1.70e+05*    (74620.730)     1.58e+05*    (74279.481) 
Log (Number of 
workers)             
    1.51e+05***  (15587.441)     1.51e+05***  (15560.009) 
Proportion 
female           
    -446.123*      (181.928)     -438.770*      (181.876) 
Age <20              -112.761       (535.095)      -91.537       (534.729) 
Age 20-29           -2242.382***    (577.594)    -2271.862***    (575.759) 
Age 40-49           -1684.923***    (479.456)    -1670.684***    (479.250) 
Age >50               497.126       (465.083)      483.413       (464.687) 
Tenure <5 yrs         650.431**     (228.204)      648.699**     (228.083) 
Tenure 5-10 yrs       656.506*      (324.075)      651.683*      (323.692) 
Intermediate 
education 
     -29.282       (284.198)      -23.628       (283.768) 
College 
education 
     573.684**     (220.890)      575.090**     (220.638) 
Postgraduate 
education 
    1906.121***    (222.724)     1906.554***    (222.405) 
Year 1995          71628.669     (53942.588)    57855.069     (53977.214) 
Year 1997           2.94e+05***  (51570.191)     2.83e+05***  (51649.448) 
Year 1999           6.17e+05***  (53588.020)     6.02e+05***  (53707.810) 
Year 2001           3.43e+05***  (73481.663)     3.42e+05***  (72892.024) 
Constant             9.62e+05***  (80653.652)     9.79e+05***  (80380.163) 
     
R-squared               0.134                        0.134                 
N                        5976                         5988                 
 
Notes: Standard deviations are given in parentheses next to the regression coefficient.  
The asterisks give the level of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
All regressions are pooled cross-sectional regressions which include year dummies for 1993-2001. 
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 Table 8:  Explaining the variance of the wage distribution – fixed-effects estimates including 
incentive pay variables 
 Variance of 
wage 
distribution 
 Variance of 
wage 
distribution 
 Variance of 
wage 
distribution 
 
       
Incentive pay -5066.441 (49815.196)  
Objective 
standards 
 -3.29e+04 (62281.090) -1.24e+05 (1.13e+05)
Subjective 
evaluations 
 96374.225 (52429.458) 2.29e+05** (77438.663)
Objective 
standards 
(first wave 
since 
introduction 
only)  
 1.03e+05 (1.07e+05)
Subjective 
evaluations  
(first wave 
since 
introduction 
only)  
 -1.74e+05* (74416.057)
Log number 
of workers 
22480.455 (55476.489) 24693.652 (55500.224) 22118.802 (55473.225)
Year 1995 1.11e+05 (59985.260) 1.15e+05 (60110.284) 1.13e+05 (60082.176)
Year 1997 4.01e+05*** (61301.516) 4.05e+05*** (61436.644) 4.02e+05*** (61679.077)
Year 1999 8.47e+05*** (65939.154) 8.44e+05*** (66121.482) 8.37e+05*** (66634.340)
Year 2001 6.20e+05*** (85579.584) 6.07e+05*** (85209.491) 5.98e+05*** (85447.385)
Constant 1.39e+06*** (2.18e+05) 1.36e+06*** (2.18e+05) 1.36e+06*** (2.18e+05)
   
N 7799 7822 7822 
Notes: Standard deviations are given in parentheses next to the regression coefficient. The asterisks 
give the level of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All regressions are fixed-effect panel 
regressions 
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Table 9 :Explaining the skewness of the wage distribution – cross-sectional estimates including 
incentive pay variables 
 Skewness of 
wage distribution 
 Skewness of 
wage distribution 
 
     
Incentive pay  -2.614  (14.099)    
Objective standards     5.441  (19.226) 
Subjective evaluations    -1.051  (15.432) 
SBI  2 Building   -92.631*** (26.203)  -93.684*** (26.200) 
SBI  3 Trade   -80.050*** (22.419)  -80.635*** (22.402) 
SBI  4 Transport   -92.915**  (32.953)  -91.783**  (32.871) 
SBI  5 Professional 
Services  
 -76.909*** (22.203)  -77.341*** (22.191) 
SBI  6 Health care  -155.933*** (21.182) -153.910*** (21.094) 
SBI  7 Other services   -92.007**  (28.237)  -90.659**  (28.167) 
SBI  8 Government  -164.469*** (24.881) -163.997*** (25.157) 
SBI  9 Education  -198.541*** (27.584) -196.488*** (27.440) 
Log number of workers 48.660***  (5.862) 48.213***  (5.849) 
Female  0.864***  (0.069)  0.865***  (0.069) 
Age <20   1.332***  (0.196)  1.327***  (0.196) 
Age 20-29   1.441***  (0.211)  1.423***  (0.210) 
Age 40-49   3.193***  (0.175)  3.188***  (0.175) 
Age >50   2.715***  (0.195)  2.716***  (0.195) 
Tenure <5 yrs   2.440***  (0.089)  2.440***  (0.089) 
Tenure 5-10 yrs   0.578***  (0.119)  0.585***  (0.119) 
Intermediate education -2.501***  (0.106) -2.495***  (0.106) 
College education -1.103***  (0.084) -1.100***  (0.083) 
Postgraduate education -3.340***  (0.089) -3.341***  (0.089) 
Year 1995 24.268  (19.782) 23.996  (19.784) 
Year 1997 43.100* (18.920) 42.698* (18.940) 
Year 1999 99.797*** (19.695) 99.149*** (19.730) 
Year 2001  -54.587* (26.967)  -54.456* (26.734) 
Constant  -97.409**  (29.956)  -97.100**  (29.841) 
     
R-squared   0.621    0.620   
N  5855   5867   
Notes: Standard deviations are given in parentheses next to the regression coefficient.  The asterisks 
give the level of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.All regressions are pooled cross-
sectional regressions 
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Table 10:Explaining the skewness of the wage distribution – fixed-effects estimates including 
incentive pay variables 
 Skewness of 
wage 
distribution 
 Skewness of 
wage 
distribution 
 Skewness of 
wage 
distribution 
 
       
Incentive 
pay  
-0.114  (30.872)       
Objective 
standards 
   -9.177  (38.449)  -23.514  (70.204) 
Subjective 
evaluations 
  -4.729 (32.509) 27.464  (48.109)
Objective 
standards 
(first wave 
since 
introduction 
only)  
   16.013  (66.465)
Subjective 
evaluations  
(first wave 
since 
introduction 
only)  
    -41.855  (45.979) 
Log number 
of workers 
 155.558*** (35.511)  155.642*** (35.430)  155.240*** (35.446)
Year 1995  -21.122  (36.841)  -20.747 (36.822)  -21.233  (36.839)
Year 1997 20.121  (37.725) 20.448 (37.701) 19.148  (37.884)
Year 1999  106.685**  (40.676)  107.345**  (40.677)  104.914* (41.035)
Year 2001 -3.832  (53.036) -4.256 (52.644) -6.904  (52.841)
Constant -417.266**   (140.673) -415.214**  (140.209) -414.163**   (140.256)
   
N  7594  7617 7617  
Notes: Standard deviations are given in parentheses next to the regression coefficient. The asterisks 
give the level of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All regressions are fixed-effect panel 
regressions 
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Table 11: Explaining the kurtosis of the wage distribution – cross-sectional estimates including 
incentive pay variables 
 Kurtosis of 
wage 
distribution 
 Kurtosis of wage 
distribution 
 
     
Incentive pay   194.483   (113.230)    
Objective standards    51.944   (154.405) 
Subjective evaluations     223.679   (123.934) 
SBI  2 Building  -585.337**   (210.441) -588.836**   (210.414) 
SBI  3 Trade  -344.813   (180.054) -343.625   (179.911) 
SBI  4 Transport  -388.529   (264.652) -388.003   (263.987) 
SBI  5 Professional Services  17.175   (178.319) 10.272   (178.215) 
SBI  6 Health care  -950.931***  (170.114) -944.534***  (169.403) 
SBI  7 Other services  -468.289*  (226.779) -467.735*  (226.209) 
SBI  8 Government  -958.621***  (199.822) -973.014***  (202.037) 
SBI  9 Education  -547.208*  (221.531) -542.893*  (220.375) 
Log number of workers 45.801  (47.083) 43.005  (46.976) 
Female  9.151***  (0.558)  9.171***  (0.558) 
Age <20   5.647***  (1.574)  5.596***  (1.572) 
Age 20-29  18.217***  (1.695) 17.989***  (1.689) 
Age 40-49  64.126***  (1.405) 64.059***  (1.404) 
Age >50   -11.713***  (1.567)  -11.750***  (1.564) 
Tenure <5 yrs  13.489***  (0.718) 13.508***  (0.717) 
Tenure 5-10 yrs  -4.767***  (0.954) -4.724***  (0.952) 
Intermediate education  -20.657***  (0.852)  -20.568***  (0.851) 
College education  -20.875***  (0.671)  -20.828***  (0.670) 
Postgraduate education  -26.387***  (0.718)  -26.376***  (0.717) 
Year 1995  234.612   (158.873)  224.435   (158.882) 
Year 1997  285.069   (151.947)  277.104   (152.107) 
Year 1999  779.700***  (158.176)  764.215***  (158.449) 
Year 2001  -21.245   (216.577)  -24.518   (214.701) 
Constant -175.421   (240.585) -160.926   (239.657) 
     
R-squared   0.598    0.598   
N  5855   5867   
Notes: Standard deviations are given in parentheses next to the regression coefficient.  
The asterisks give the level of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
All regressions are pooled cross-sectional regressions which include year dummies for 1993-2001. 
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Table 12: Explaining the kurtosis of the wage distribution – fixed-effects estimates including incentive 
pay variables 
 Kurtosis of 
wage 
distribution 
 Kurtosis of 
wage 
distribution 
 Kurtosis of 
wage 
distribution 
 
       
Incentive pay   520.170   (270.104)       
Year 1995  -41.621   (322.324)  -35.205   (322.108)  -30.189   (322.246) 
Year 1997  -22.056   (330.064)  -10.733   (329.799)  4.020   (331.388) 
Year 1999  535.421   (355.882)  535.647   (355.832)  561.981   (358.956) 
Year 2001 -116.651   (464.023)  -66.195   (460.513)  -38.813   (462.232) 
Log number 
of workers 
 981.732**   (310.687)  985.515**   (309.934)  988.815**   (310.063) 
Objective 
standards 
   -234.854   (336.339) -144.448   (614.112) 
Subjective 
evaluations 
    583.945*  (284.379)  278.295   (420.839) 
Objective 
standards 
(first wave 
since 
introduction 
only)  
      -100.285   (581.408) 
Subjective 
evaluations  
(first wave 
since 
introduction 
only)  
       396.766   (402.202) 
Constant  -2983.295* (1230.765)  -2963.003* (1226.511)  -2971.437* (1226.891) 
       
N  7594  7617  7617  
Notes: Standard deviations are given in parentheses next to the regression coefficient. The asterisks 
give the level of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All regressions are fixed-effect panel 
regressions 
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B. Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Density distribution of mean wages by SBI 
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Notes: The figure gives the density distribution of mean monthly wages in the year 1995. A distinction 
is made between one-digit SBI sectors:  (1) Agriculture and industry, (2) Building,  (3) Trade, (4) 
Transport, (5) Professional Services, (6) Health care, (7) Other Services, (8) Government, (9) 
Education 
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Figure 2: Density: Distribution of mean wages across different size categories 
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Notes: The figure gives the density distribution of mean monthly wages in the year 1995. A distinction 
is made between different sizes, ranging from 1-9 (Size 1), through 10-19 (Size 2) , 20-49 (Size 3), 50-
99 (Size 4), 100-499 (Size 5), to >500 (Size 6). Wages are in Dutch Guilders.  
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Figure 3: Mean wage difference by SBI sector  
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Notes: The figure gives the estimated difference between the SBI sector relative to the sector 
agriculture / industry (SBI 1). Estimated difference is based on the cross-sectional regression of mean 
wage levels of firms (cf. Table 3, column 1). Wages are in Dutch Guilders.  
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Figure 4: Density: Distribution of mean wages for firms using different forms of incentive pay 
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Notes: The figure gives the density distribution of mean monthly wages in the year 1995. A distinction 
is made between those organizations that know no incentive pay, that have incentive pay solemnly on 
subjective or objective standards, or both. Wages are in Dutch Guilders.  
 
